Skip to content

Blog

Engineering and Evaluating an Autonomous Agent for Post-Exploitation

AI agents are increasingly demonstrating impressive vulnerability-discovery capabilities. But what happens after a bug is exploited and the agent gets onto the system?

For a human red teamer, post-exploitation is often where the interesting work begins. Initial access provides a foothold, but accomplishing a meaningful objective requires much more: understanding the environment, finding useful credentials, deciding which paths are worth pursuing, validating access, enumerating permissions, and determining whether that access leads to objectives or enables meaningful security impact.

Over the past few years, I've been experimenting with using AI agents to automate portions of offensive security. More recently, I've focused on this post-exploitation problem: can an AI agent take an initial foothold and independently reason its way toward meaningful impact?

The short answer from my testing is yes — but reliable performance requires careful engineering.

When successful, the agent could move from an operator-provided objective to credential discovery and authenticated data access in only a few minutes and for well under a dollar of model inference. The more interesting finding, however, was how heavily that performance depended on the complete agent system: the model, system prompts, tools, orchestration, context, and safeguards.

The model mattered, but the real unit of evaluation was the complete agent system.

Engineering and Evaluating an Autonomous Agent for Post-Exploitation

Sparring with Agents: Defending Against Autonomous Attacks

I recently built an autonomous attack system and deployed it against several live production systems. After successfully reaching post-exploitation impact, I asked myself what would have stopped it, and I came up with several potential metrics that organizations might track to measure and improve their defensibility specifically against autonomous attackers. In this post I'll introduce three of those metrics and some early, untested ideas for influencing them.

Two caveats up front. First, these ideas are in their infancy. I haven't validated them yet, but I plan to soon. Second, everything here comes from analyzing one attack system — my own. Admittedly, coming up with defenses against my own offensive agents risks overfitting to my tooling rather than to autonomous attackers in general, so treat these as hypotheses and starting points for your own measurements, not as a tried and true framework.

These attack agents are tightly guardrailed and closely monitored. I plan to share more about the system in another post.

Combating Autonomous Attacks

How to Find and Fix Bugs Using AI Agents

We need AI Agents that discover issues, comprehend impact, and initiate prioritized remediation.

Static secret scanners are insufficient alone. They don't understand impact or prioritize remediation very well. For this project, I wanted to see if I could build an AI agent that could discover one leaked credential, spread to find more credentials, and then safely initiate the rotation and removal of all discovered secrets.

How to Find and Fix Bugs Using AI Agents

Transitioning From OffSec to Red Teaming

Over the years, I've seen four common challenges that can hold back offensive security professionals who want to move into red teaming:

  • grasping the red teaming philosophy
  • adopting an adversarial mindset
  • understanding red team operations
  • gaining hands-on experience

Transitioning From OffSec to Red Teaming